Blurred Lines  Means Changing Focus: Juries Composed of Musical Artists Should Decide Music Copyright Infringement Cases, Not Lay Juries by Palmer, Jason
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law 
Volume 18 
Issue 4 Issue 4 - Summer 2016 Article 7 
2016 
"Blurred Lines" Means Changing Focus: Juries Composed of 
Musical Artists Should Decide Music Copyright Infringement 
Cases, Not Lay Juries 
Jason Palmer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jason Palmer, "Blurred Lines" Means Changing Focus: Juries Composed of Musical Artists Should Decide 
Music Copyright Infringement Cases, Not Lay Juries, 18 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and 
Technology Law 907 (2020) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw/vol18/iss4/7 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law by an authorized editor of 
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
"Blurred Lines" Means Changing
Focus: Juries Composed of Musical
Artists Should Decide Music
Copyright Infringement Cases, Not
Lay Juries
ABSTRACT
The verdict in Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., or the
"Blurred Lines" case, surprised a lot of people. It surprised the public,
as many did not expect there to be infringement. It also surprised the
litigants, because the jury's special verdict form contained a logical
inconsistency indicating that something had been decided incorrectly.
However, the jury cannot be faulted for this inconsistency because it
was tasked with deciphering the indecipherable. The fault lies in the
way copyright law establishes infringement. This Note investigates the
apparent circuit split in determining music copyright infringement and
proposes that it is illusory. All circuits are attempting to do the same
thing while using different language. The "different" tests used by each
circuit all suffer from the same flaws: lack of a definition for "musical
idea" and "musical expression" and the inability to pinpoint how
"substantial" substantial similarity is. Given the complicated nature of
music, tinkering with the tests or establishing definitions is futile. The
change should focus on the trier of fact who applies the test. Juries
composed of musicians should decide whether there is infringement in
music copyright cases by balancing the interest of the plaintiff artist in
owning the allegedly protected expression and the interest of the music
community as a whole in using and building upon the allegedly
protected expression. This process will ensure that music copyright's
goal of benefitting the public is pursued with the most deliberate of
intentions.
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[Gaye Counsel] Q: Okay. Do you believe it's simply coincidental that these two have the
spoken section that begin at the exact same bar and the exact same measure and end at
the exact same bar and the exact same measure?
[Robin Thicke] A: Yes, it is coincidental.
Q: Do you know of any other song in the world ever created in the history of music
after-that has a spoken section deviating from the rest of the song that begins at the
same exact same bar and the same exact measure as "Got [tlo Give It Up" and "Blurred
Lines"?
A: Just about every song on the radio.
Q: Can you name one, please?




1. Reporter's Tr. of Day Two of Trial Proceedings, Morning Session at 76-77, Williams
v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-06004-JAK-AGR (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2015), ECF No. 349
[hereinafter Day 2 Morning Transcript].
"BLURRED LINES" MEANS CHANGING FOCUS
I. INTRODUCTION
"Blurred Lines" garnered a lot of attention. The artists that
produced the song are well-known: Robin Thicke is a renowned R&B
artist,2 Pharrell Williams is a Grammy-winning music producer,3 and
Clifford "T.I." Harris is an acclaimed rap artist.4 The music video was
provocative, receiving approximately 440 million views on
YouTube.com to date.5 The song was even scrutinized for implicating
socially unbecoming behavior.
6
The family of the late Marvin Gaye believed that "Blurred
Lines" infringed Gaye's "Got to Give It Up."7  In 2013, they sued
Thicke, Williams, and Harris, and ultimately the jury decided that
"Blurred Lines" did infringe "Got to Give It Up."
Music copyright law regulates how much a new work may copy
an older work.9 It states that too much copying gives rise to liability
for infringement, but it is careful to permit some copying so that new
works can meaningfully build on older works.10 The "Blurred Lines"
trial showcased copyright law's struggle in locating this threshold of
efficient creativity. The opening quotation captures more than the
comically shaded tension that pervaded the trial; it shows that Robin
Thicke, as an artist, believes the threshold of efficient creativity
should be located at a place that does not allow an artist to own the
placement of a "spoken section" within a song.
The difficulty in locating this threshold is not unique to the
Ninth Circuit, the circuit through which most of the case proceeded.1
Every circuit has struggled with locating this threshold and has
2. Robin Thicke Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM, http://www.biography.com/people/robin-
thicke-21209847 [https://perma.cc/DF4D-VTAQ].
3. Pharrell Williams Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM, http://www.biography.com/people/
pharrell-williams [https://perma.cc/AM9P-WU87].
4. Hip-Hop Star & Actor TI., PEOPLE (Apr. 24, 2006), http://www.people.com/people/
archive/article/0,,20059205,00.html [https://perma.cc/P465-8TSA].
5. Robin Thicke, Robin Thicke-Blurred Lines ft. TI., Pharrell, YOUTUBE (Mar. 20,
2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-yyDUClLUXSU [https://perma.cc/TC23-UKZK];
Reporter's Tr. of Day Two of Trial Proceedings-P.M. Session at 46-47, Williams v. Bridgeport
Music, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-06004-JAK-AGR (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2015), ECF No. 332 [hereinafter
Day 2 Afternoon Transcript].
6. Dorian Lynskey, Blurred Lines: The Most Controversial Song of the Decade, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2013, 2:32 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/music/2013/nov/13fblurred-
lines -most-controversial-song-decade [https://perma.cc[UVV5-VPRY].
7. See generally Day 2 Morning Transcript.
8. See generally Special Verdict, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-
06004-JAK-AGR (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2015), ECF No. 320 [hereinafter Special Verdict].
9. 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2012).
10. B. MacPaul Stanfield, Finding the Fact of Familiarity: Assessing Judicial Similarity
Tests in Copyright Infringement Actions, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 489, 493 (2001).
11. See infra Part III.B.2.
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developed or adopted a test in hopes that the test would yield accurate
decisions.12 The problem is that all of the tests do the same thing
under the guise of different terminology.13 Because of this, each
circuit lacks a definition for "musical idea" and "musical expression,"
and none define when the similarity between two songs is substantial
enough to infer that a defendant infringed.'4 Furthermore, they all
employ the same method to find substantial similarity: juries
composed of lay people decide.15
The problem with sending the issues to a lay jury is that a lay
jury in a music copyright infringement case does not have a requisite
understanding of music to be able to decide the issues presented.6
This leads to less accurate trial verdicts, which is a concern in
Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc. (the "Blurred Lines" case) since the
verdict form contained logical inconsistencies suggesting that
infringement was decided incorrectly. 7 Inaccurate verdicts mean
either that artists can copy too much from other artists or cannot copy
enough, both of which frustrate creative development in the music
industry. For example, not being able to copy enough from other
artists-without being liable for infringement-may create a chilling
effect that discourages artists from creating music. It may also
encourage monopolistic behavior where artists attempt to own
collections of sounds that may one day become popular. A chilling
effect is undesirable because it would sift out useful musical
progression. Monopolistic behavior of this kind is undesirable because
the focus of artists would be on reserving sounds solely for future
profit rather than building on other artists' sounds. Preventing these
problems is of singular importance since music permeates our society
in a number of aspects8 : film, videogames, television, religious
worship, birthday parties, weddings, advertisements, sports, and
more. A decrease in the quality of music is arguably a decrease in the
quality of life; therefore, it is imperative that the law protects the
incentives that foster its growth.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Douglas Y'Barbo, On the Legal Standard for Copyright Infringement, 1999
UCLA J.L. & TECH. 3, 18 (1999) ('If the Second and Ninth Circuit standards are in fact identical,
then their disparate vernacular and structure needs to be reconciled.").
14. See infra Part III.B.2.
15. Id.
16. See infra Part IV.A.
17. See Margit Livingston & Joseph Urbinato, Copyright Infringement of Music:
Determining Whether What Sounds Alike Is Alike, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 227, 280 (2013).
18. J. Michael Keyes, Musical Musings: The Case for Rethinking Music Copyright
Protection, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 407, 423 (2004).
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Part II of this Note establishes the constitutional basis for
copyright law, the goal of copyright law, and the interests it balances
to achieve that goal. Part III describes the elements of an
infringement claim, reviews the circuit split on substantial similarity,
and shows why the split is illusory and all tests are equally unhelpful.
Part IV explains the "Blurred Lines" trial and verdict problems, the
complexities of music that lay jurors face in deciding music copyright
infringement cases, and the reverberating effects of the "Blurred
Lines" verdict on the music industry. Part V suggests that juries in
all music copyright infringement cases be composed of musical artists,
investigates the benefits of using such a jury, and compares this
solution to other proposed solutions.
II. COPYRIGHT: CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS, PURPOSE, AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF MUSIC COPYRIGHT LAW
Copyright law is an effectuation of language in the US
Constitution, which states: "The Congress shall have Power... To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."19 Congress exercised this power
by promulgating the Copyright Acts of 1790, 1909, and 1976.20 Under
the current Act of 1976, copyright protection exists for "original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device."
21
Even though copyright law protects an author's copyrightable
works, the goal of copyright law is to benefit the public.22 It achieves
this goal by balancing the author's interest in benefiting from her own
work and other authors' interests in building on that work.23 In
practice, this means allowing one artist to briefly own her original
expression of ideas while allowing other artists to freely copy the ideas
themselves with impunity.24 Through this process, the public freely
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 8.
20. See generally Joseph P. Bauer, Addressing the Incoherency of the Preemption
Provision of the Copyright Act of 1976, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 6 (2007) (discussing the
differences between each Act and the problems the 1976 Act remedied).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
22. Nicole K. Roodhuyzen, Do We Even Need a Test? A Reevaluation of Assessing
Substantial Similarity in a Copyright Infringement Case, 15 J.L. & POL'y 1375, 1379-80 (2007);
B. MacPaul Stanfield, Finding the Fact of Familiarity: Assessing Judicial Similarity Tests in
Copyright Infringement Actions, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 489, 493 (2001).
23. Roodhuyzen, supra note 22, at 1380.
24. Stanfield, supra note 22, at 493.
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benefits from the ideas that one author expressed as well as from
further development of those ideas by other authors. The author who
owns a copyright is incentived to continue expressing ideas, knowing
that she will benefit from her own work.25 If this balance of interests
is thrown off kilter, the public's benefit decreases. If artists do not
benefit sufficiently from their own work, they will not work, which will
result in fewer ideas upon which the artist community could build.26
If an artist benefits too much from her work, meaning copyright law
protects more of her work than it should, then the artist community is
not left with enough material upon which to expound and develop the
art. Therefore, "[w]hen elements of the copyright system hinder
dissemination of copyrighted works without providing adequate
benefits to the creators or distributors of works, those elements of the
system should be eliminated.'2
7
Congress first gave effect to constitutional copyright language
through the Copyright Act of 1790.28 This Act prohibited the
nonconsensual copying of maps, charts, and books.29 Copyright first
began regulating the music industry in 1831, when Congress added
musical compositions to the list of copyrightable works.30 At this time,
technology limited the industry's fixation abilities to sheet music,31
limiting the extent of music copyright coverage.32 Human ingenuity
eventually led to the creation of machines, such as the piano roll, that
allowed for the reproduction of sheet music in another form.33 This
form differed from sheet music in that a musician no longer read a
document that indicated which notes to play; a canister-like object
rotated inside a piano, mechanically triggering notes by using
25. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 673, 675 (2003).
26. Jennifer Understahl, Copyright Infringement and Poetry: When is a Red
Wheelbarrow the Red Wheelbarrow?, 58 VAND. L. REV. 915, 920 (2005).
27. Loren, supra note 25, at 675-76.
28. Stephanie J. Jones, Music Copyright in Theory and Practice: An Improved Approach
for Determining Substantial Similarity, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 277, 280 (1993). Copyright was first
recognized in the United States in 1783 when the Colonial Congress passed a resolution
recommending that states provide copyright protection to authors or publishers of new books. Id.
at 279.
29. Id. at 280.
30. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436, 436 (1831) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §
102 (2012)); Loren, supra note 25, at 683.
31. Sheet music is a document containing written musical expressions that a musician
interprets while playing an instrument. See Sheet Music, THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM,,
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/sheet+music [https://perma.cc/6BLG-EVLP].
32. See Loren, supra note 25, at 679; see also Jamie Lund, Fixing Music Copyright, 79
BROOK. L. REV. 61, 68 (2013).
33. Loren, supra note 25, at 680.
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perforations in the canister that caused the piano's keys to sound.34
Courts found this form different than sheet music because the piano
rolls were component parts of the machine rather than copies of the
musical composition, and thus held that piano rolls did not infringe
the sheet music of musical composition copyrights.35  Congress
responded by overruling this interpretation and giving owners of
musical composition copyrights the right to mechanical reproduction
of their works.36  This right encompasses piano roll technology,
compact discs (CDs), cassettes, and anything that involves
mechanically duplicating the audible sound discerned from the sheet
music.
37
Congress made the right to mechanical reproduction
compulsory, meaning that a copier was not required to obtain
permission from the copyright's holder, but did need to pay royalties if
the copier used the copyrighted work.38 It did this in response to the
concern of a music publishing company that amassed a monopolistic
collection of musical composition copyrights, giving it an oppressive
advantage in the field. 39 By allowing the compulsory license, Congress
ameliorated this devastating effect. The compulsory license has a
royalty rate provided by statute, which Congress modernizes
periodically.40
The technological progression of the late 1800s41 required
additional copyright protection. Familiar names, such as Thomas
Edison and Alexander Graham Bell, created devices that recorded
audible music on physical mediums.42  Emile Berliner's later
invention, the gramophone, recorded music on flat discs or records.43
Congress protected this new form by creating the sound recording
copyright in the Sound Recording Act of 1971.44 This sound recording
copyright is separate and distinct from the musical composition
copyright: while the latter covers musical characteristics found in a
typical piece of sheet music, such as melody, harmony, rhythm, and
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 681.
37. See id.
38. Id. When one copies and distributes another's musical composition for profit, a
percentage of that profit must be paid to the owner of the musical composition copyright; this
percentage is the royalty. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 115(c).
39. Loren, supra note 25, at 680-83.
40. See id. at 681.
41. Keyes, supra note 18, at 414.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Lund, supra note 32, at 68.
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lyrics, 45 the sound recording copyright protects the sounds fixed in a
phonorecord,46 such as tempo, instrumentation, key, and style.47
Another distinction between these two copyrights is that the sound
recording copyright only protects the exact replications of earlier
recordings, such that others may make "sound-alikes.' ' 48 The practical
benefit of creating this distinction was recognition of specialization:
some artists were solely composers, and some were solely
performers.49  Generally, a composer owns a work's musical
composition copyright, whereas a performer (typically a record label)
owns the sound recording copyright.50 Therefore, if a music performer
made a sound recording of a composition that included additional
expressive elements that were both original to that sound recording
and that satisfied the Copyright Act's "modicum of creativity"
requirement, she would own a copyright over all of that new and
original creative expression.
51
In 1995, Congress added a digital performance right to the
sound recording copyright.52 Congress added this right in response to
pressure from the music industry concerning pay-per-view-type
services that threatened the sale of CDs.53 Notably, though, the right
that Congress added was limited: it protected digital public
performance of the sound recording, but not general public
performance (playing a song over speakers in an auditorium).54 The
result was that the holder of a sound recording copyright could sue for
infringement in the first case, but only the holder of a musical
composition copyright (which comes with general public performance
rights) could sue for the latter.55
Greater technological innovation ensured that a CD purchase
was not the only method to acquire music. Music could be transferred
45. Id. at 66.
46. 'Phonorecords" are material objects in which sounds, other than those
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known
or later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. 17 U.S.C. § 101. The term
"phonorecords" includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed. See also id.
47. Lund, supra note 32, at 67.
48. Id. at 70.
49. Id. at 67-68.
50. Id. at 69; Loren, supra note 25, at 686 ("[C]opyrights in sound recordings are
typically owned by the record labels .... ").
51. Lund, supra note 32, at 70.
52. Loren, supra note 25, at 687.
53. Id. at 688.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 688, 722 n.67.
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through computer files between consumers.56 However, holders of
sound recording copyrights feared that they would lose royalties,
which were granted via compulsory mechanical composition
copyright.57 Congress thus extended to holders of sound recording
copyrights the right to receive compulsory royalties for the digital
reproduction of their works through downloading as well as the
mechanical reproduction of their works.
58
III. INFRINGEMENT
The essential elements of a copyright infringement claim are
(1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2) copying of constituent
elements of the work that are original.59 A plaintiff must prove
infringement by a preponderance of the evidence.60 However, some
circuits allow strong proof of substantial similarity to compensate for
weak proof of access.6 1 No circuit allows strong proof of access to
compensate for weak proof of substantial similarity.
The defendant in a music copyright suit may marshal several
defenses. In addition to statute of limitations and laches, a defendant
may attack the validity of the copyright, demonstrate misuse of the
copyright, or allege estoppel, fair use, or unclean hands.62  Two
additional defenses, somewhat related, are prior common source and
independent creation.63 The prior common source defense states that
the similarities between the alleged infringer and the copyright holder
exist in a prior work, making the similarities in the at-issue works
unoriginal, not copyrightable, and not infringeable.64 The defense of
independent creation means that an infringement action will not
succeed because the second element of the plaintiffs prima facie
case-that the defendant copied the plaintiff-is not satisfied because
the similarities are the result of coincidence rather than copying.65
Copyright infringement is a strict liability tort, resulting in liability
56. Id. at 690.
57. Id. at 689.
58. Id.
59. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); Marc K. Temin,
The Irrelevance of Creativity: Feist's Wrong Turn and the Scope of Copyright Protection for
Factual Works, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 263, 264 (2006).
60. 18 C.J.S. Copyrights § 117 (2015).
61. See generally David Aronoff, Exploding the "Inverse Ratio Rule," 55 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y U.S.A. 125 (2008).
62. 18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyright and Literary Property §§ 262-68.
63. Id. at §§ 264-65.
64. Id. at § 265.
65. Id. at § 264.
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for even subconscious copying of another's work.66 Unintentional
copying is innocent infringement and therefore is not a defense to an
infringement claim.6 7 But liability for innocent infringement may
result in a defendant paying fewer damages than liability for willful
infringement.
A. Ownership of a Valid Copyright
Copyright protection exists for "original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.'68  In order to prove ownership of a valid copyright, the
plaintiff must prove that the plaintiffs work was original and
copyrightable and that plaintiff complied with statutory formalities.69
A copyright registered within five years of the first publication creates
a rebuttable presumption that plaintiff owns a valid copyright.70 To
rebut the presumption of originality, a defendant must show either
that the work was not created by the plaintiff or the work did not
possess a minimal degree of creativity.71 Showing that plaintiffs work
is an idea rather than the expression of an idea, for example, would
rebut the presumption that the work was copyrightable.72  This
element of the infringement claim is not frequently the battlefront of
litigation.
73
66. Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright, Creation, and Context, 41
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 477, 477 (2007); Christopher Brett Jaeger, 'Does That Sound Familiar?':"
Creators' Liability for Unconscious Copyright Infringement, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1903, 1905 (2008)
(arguing that liability for subconscious copying is not conducive to the purpose of copyright law);
see Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 482-85 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding Bolton liable
for subconscious copying).
67. Colin Conerton, Note, Update Needed? Digital Downloaders and the Innocent
Infringer Defense, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 587, 591 (2013) (explaining that the defendant's
state of mind in a copyright infringement suit is not relevant to liability but is relevant to
damages).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
69. 18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyright and Literary Property § 254.
70. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c).
71. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
72. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) ("No
author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates.").
73. Aaron M. Broaddus, Eliminating the Confusion: A Restatement of the Test for
Copyright Infringement, 5 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POLY 43, 45 (1995).
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B. Copying of Constituent Elements of the Work that Are Original
Because plaintiffs rarely have direct proof that the defendant
copied the plaintiffs work,74 the second element of the infringement
claim is often proved by circumstantial evidence of access and
probative similarity to plaintiffs work and substantial similarity to
plaintiffs work.
75
1. Access and Probative Similarity
Access means the defendant had an opportunity to view or hear
the plaintiffs work.76 The plaintiff need not show that the defendant
actually viewed or heard the plaintiffs work.77 As discussed earlier,
substantial similarity may compensate for weak evidence of access
and essentially allow a plaintiff to succeed on an infringement claim
by proving access by less than a preponderance of the evidence.78 This
is called the inverse ratio rule.79 Substantial similarity strong enough
to compensate for access and lead to an inference of infringement is
referred to as striking similarity.80 Two clarifications in this regard
bear emphasis. First, access is a necessity of infringement: one cannot
copy what one does not have.81 Therefore, the access requirement is
not dispensed with when there is striking similarity-it is only
softened.8 2 Second, even if there is striking similarity, a defendant
can still prove there was no access to the plaintiffs work and that the
similarities result from independent creation or a prior common
source.8 3
Along with access, courts will typically review works for
probative similarity84 Probative similarity is a preliminary finding
that the works are similar.85  This similarity may exist in
74. William R. Coulson, They're Playing Our Song! The Promise and the Perils of Music
Copyright Litigation, 13 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PRop. L. 555, 560 (2014) ("[C]opiers are
rarely caught red-handed."').
75. See generally Eric Rogers, Substantially Unfair: An Empirical Examination of
Copyright Substantial Similarity Analysis Among the Federal Circuits, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV.
893, 902 (2013).
76. Broaddus, supra note 73, at 47.
77 la.
78. See id. at 48.
79. See generally Aronoff, supra note 61.
80. Rogers, supra note 75, at 903.
81. Broaddus, supra note 73, at 47.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 49.
84. See Rogers, supra note 75, at 902.
85. Id.
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copyrightable or non-copyrightable elements of the works.86 Probative
similarity is not substantial similarity;8 7 it is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition of substantial similarity.88 Thus, where there is
no probative similarity, there is no need to inquire into substantial
similarity.8 9 This also means that any court necessarily believes there
is probative similarity between the works if it inquires into
substantial similarity.90
2. Substantial Similarity: The Circuit Split
After access and probative similarity have raised a rebuttable
presumption that the defendant infringed, the plaintiff must prove
substantial similarity between the works to show that the defendant's
presumed copying was to an "unfair degree" and therefore actionable
under copyright law.91 Scholars have proposed several methods to
show substantial similarity,92 and circuit courts have split on which
method is best.93 Most circuits have employed one of two dominant
tests-the ordinary observer test or the extrinsic/intrinsic
analysis-yet some have combined the two or even employed other
tests.94 A closer look at each test shows that each is the same in that
each seeks to distinguish between "musical ideas" and "musical
expressions" and each attempts to specify how "substantial" the
similarities between two works must be before unfair copying may be
presumed. Therefore, even though the "Blurred Lines" case worked
through the Ninth Circuit, it is likely that the decision would not have
changed through the application of a different circuit's test.
86. See id.
87. See generally Alan Latman, 'Probative Similarity" As Proof of Copying: Toward
Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1191 (1990).
88. See Rogers, supra note 75, at 902.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 903.
92. See, e.g., lyar Stay, Musical Plagiarism: A True Challenge for the Copyright Law, 25
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 14-18 (2014) (describing, among others, pattern
tests, abstraction tests, and filtration tests as ways to determine substantial similarity).
93. John W. Gregory, A Necessary Global Discussion for Improvements to U.S.
Copyright Law on Music Sampling, 15 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 4, 109 (2012).
94. Nicole K. Roodhuyzen, Do We Even Need a Test? A Reevaluation of Assessing
Substantial Similarity in a Copyright Infringement Case, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 1375, 1385-86 (2007)
("[T]he Tenth Circuit uses the abstractionlfiltration/comparison test and the Sixth Circuit and
the D.C. Circuit use a variation of this test."); see also Francescatti v. Germanotta, No. 11 CV
5270, 2014 WL 2767231, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 17, 2014).
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a. Second Circuit and Family: The Ordinary Observers
Judge Learned Hand developed the conceptual framework for
substantial similarity in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.95 In his
infringement analysis, Judge Hand acknowledged that copyright
infringement was not limited to situations in which the defendant
exactly copied the plaintiffs work.96 Therefore, he reasoned that there
must be a substantiality requirement.97 In order to analyze whether
this substantiality requirement was met, Judge Hand developed an
"abstractions test."9 8  This test involved determining whether the
elements of a work are more idea-like, and thus not copyrightable, or
more expression-like, and thus copyrightable.9 9 Substantial similarity
between the expressions of the works meant the defendant illicitly
copied the plaintiffs work.100 Judge Hand explained that substantial
similarity existed between two works if an ordinary observer would
regard their appeal as the same, overlooking disparities unless the
observer set out to detect them.101 Judge Hand did not believe expert
testimony was to play a part in this analysis.
10 2
The Second Circuit attempted to implement Judge Hand's
framework in its Arnstein v. Porter decision.10 3 In Arnstein, the court
announced a two-pronged test for substantial similarity requiring
(1) proof that the defendant copied the plaintiff and (2) proof that the
copying went so far as to constitute improper appropriation.0 4 Within
the first prong, access and probative similarity are used to prove that
defendant copied.0 5  Expert testimony is permissible under this
prong.106 If an inference of copying exists through satisfaction of the
first prong, the jury is to decide whether the copying went so far as to
constitute improper copying.0 7 Within this prong, expert testimony is
inappropriate.08 The Arnstein court stated that the second prong




99. See id. at 283-84.
100. See id. at 283.
101. Rogers, supra note 75, at 904.
102. Id.
103. Jones, supra note 28, at 285.
104. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
105. See Jones, supra note 28, at 286; Alice J. Kim, Expert Testimony and Substantial
Similarity: Facing the Music in (Music) Copyright Infringement Cases, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 109, 112-14 (1995).
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examines "whether defendant took from plaintiffs work so much of
what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the
audience for whom such popular music is composed, that defendant
wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff."10 9
This two-pronged inquiry became the Second Circuit's "ordinary
observer test."'110
The Second Circuit reformulated the test to create a "more
discerning ordinary observer test."1 ' The reason for this
reformulation was the possible inaccuracy of the regular ordinary
observer test, which had no mechanism to prevent juries from finding
that infringement was present where a defendant substantially copied
unprotectable elements from the plaintiffs work. The reformulated
more discerning ordinary observer test suggests that the jury would
gain an understanding of copyright law so that the only things
considered in its analysis would be protectable elements of a work.11 2
The First and Third Circuits' tests are the same as the Second
Circuit's more discerning ordinary observer test.
113
All ordinary observer courts require there to be access,
probative similarity, and substantial similarity. They also all desire
to prevent infringement findings from occurring where substantial
similarity results from unprotected elements of a work. For the
Second Circuit, it applies the more discerning ordinary observer test
to filter out the unprotected expression in a work.1 14 The First and
Third Circuits do the same.1 15 Therefore, all of the tests fall victim to
the criticism that there is no definition for "musical idea," which in
turn means there is no definition for "musical expression."1 16 Nor do
any of the tests define how "substantial" substantial similarity
actually is.117 The closest thing there is to making this determination,
and one source of the illusory circuit split, is the variation among the
circuits on whether substantial similarity should be assessed from the
viewpoint of the intended audience. However, this relies on the fact
that the intended audience has a better chance than an unintended
audience at knowing when there is substantial similarity; it does not
109. Id. at 473.
110. See Rogers, supra note 75, at 904.
111. Id. at 905.
112. Id. at 904-05.
113. See Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 719, 724 (2010).
114. Rogers, supra note 75, at 905.
115. Id. at 906-07.
116. Kim, supra note 105, at 118; see generally Jones, supra note 28.
117. See Douglas YBarbo, On the Legal Standard for Copyright Infringement, 1999
UCLA J.L. & TECH. 3, *17 (1991).
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rely on the fact that the intended audience knows when there is
substantial similarity.
b. Ninth Circuit and Family: Extrinsic/Intrinsic Analysis
Until 1977, the Ninth Circuit used the Second Circuit's
ordinary observer test.118 But in Sid & Mary Krofft v. McDonald's
Corp., the Ninth Circuit developed a new test designed to embrace
Judge Hand's idea-expression dichotomy.119 This new test-commonly
called the extrinsic/intrinsic analysis or the Krofft test-is a two-step
process that begins with an extrinsic analysis.120 The trier of fact first
determines whether there is similarity between the ideas of the works
at issue.121 This step requires analytical dissection1 22 of a work and
expert testimony to separate the protectable and unprotectable
elements of a work.1 23 The second step, the intrinsic prong, analyzes
whether there is similarity between the expressions of the works at
issue.124 This prong is subjective and asks whether the ordinary,
reasonable person would find the "total concept and feel" of the works
to be substantially similar.1 25 To prevail under the extrinsic/intrinsic
test, a plaintiff must show substantial similarity under both the
extrinsic prong and the intrinsic prong.126
The Eighth Circuit1 27 and the Eleventh Circuit 2 both use the
extrinsic/intrinsic test. The Fourth Circuit uses the extrinsic/intrinsic
analysis from an intended audience perspective.1 29  Accordingly,
during the intrinsic analysis, it would consider the total concept and
feel of the work from the viewpoint of the intended audience of the
118. Rogers, supra note 75, at 907.
119. Jones, supra note 28, at 290.
120. Order Regarding P1's and Counter-Defs.' Mot. for J. as a Matter of Law, Williams v.
Bridgeport Music, Inc., (No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx)), 2015 WL 4479500, at *21 [hereinafter
JMOL Order].
121. Kim, supra note 105, at 114.
122. Id.
123. Nicholas R. Monlux, An Invitation for Infringement: How the Ninth Circuit's
Extrinsic and Intrinsic Similarity Tests Encourage Infringement: An Analysis Using Reece v.
Island Treasures Art Gallery, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 543, 550 (2009).
124. Kim, supra note 105, at 114.
125. JMOL Order, supra note 120, at *21.
126. Rogers, supra note 75, at 908.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Watt v. Butler, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2010) ("To establish
substantial similarity, the plaintiff must satisfy an extrinsic as well as an intrinsic test."), aff d,
457 F. App'x 856 (11th Cir. 2012); Lil' Joe Wein Music, Inc. v. Jackson, 245 F. App'x 873, 877
(11th Cir. 2007) (same).
129. See Kim, supra note 105, at 115-16.
20161
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
work, rather than as an ordinary lay observer.1 30 Tenth Circuit courts
have also employed the extrinsic/intrinsic analysis.131 Although the
Tenth Circuit has also adopted an abstraction/filtration/comparison
test for infringement involving computer programs,132 it is unclear
whether this test is applicable to arts, such as music.133
Just like courts using the ordinary observer model, courts
performing the extrinsic/intrinsic analysis require that there be
access, probative similarity, and substantial similarity between the
works to give rise to an inference of illicit copying. Because the
extrinsic/intrinsic analysis explicitly employs the idea-expression
dichotomy, it more clearly suffers from the lack of a definition for
"musical idea" and "musical expression." The criticism that lay
listeners may not know exactly what substantial similarity is also
remains applicable,134 as does the incomplete solution of making a
hypothetical member of the intended audience decide the question.
c. Others
The Sixth Circuit conducts a filtration/comparison test.1 35
Under this test, the court first determines which parts of plaintiffs
work, if any, are protectable.136  Then the court filters out the
unprotectable elements so that only the protected elements are
further considered under its infringement analysis.1 37 This is the
filtration prong.138 Next, the court determines whether the allegedly
infringing work is substantially similar to the protectable elements of
the plaintiffs work through comparison of the works.139 This is the
comparison prong, and the inquiry is assessed from the viewpoint of
the lay observer.140 The Fifth Circuit seems to be the same,1 41 though
130. Rogers, supra note 75, at 908-09.
131. See, e.g., Cartier v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1046, 1049 (10th Cir. 1995).
132. Matthew J. Faust, What Do We Do with a Doctrine Like Merger? A Look at the
Imminent Collision of the DMCA and Idea/Expression Dichotomy, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 131, 140 (2008).
133. 2 THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 14:33.
134. See Y'Barbo, supra note 117, at *17.
135. Rogers, supra note 75, at 910.
136. See William A. Hall, Copyright-Kohus v. Mariol: The Sixth Circuit Adopts
Two-Step Test for Substantial Similarity in Copyright Infringement, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 995,
1007 (2004).
137. Id.
138. See Rogers, supra note 75, at 910.
139. Hall, supra note 136, at 1008.
140. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 275 (6th Cir. 2009).
141. See Batiste v. Najm, 28 F. Supp. 3d 595, 610 (E.D. La. 2014) (explaining that the
court will first "filter" out unprotectable elements and then compare them side-by-side).
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scholars have labeled it as an ordinary observer circuit.142 The Fifth
Circuit makes its comparison from the viewpoint of the works'
intended audience.
143
The Seventh Circuit's test has been considered "somewhat
nebulous" and confusing.144 Scholars have labeled the Seventh Circuit
as an ordinary observer court.145 However, some Seventh Circuit
courts have created a kinship between the Second and Ninth's tests,
explaining that the Seventh Circuit test focuses more heavily on the
intrinsic prong of the Ninth Circuit's test.146 The Seventh Circuit
itself recently declined to adopt any test, stating that the various tests
are in "pseudo-conflict" and that any road requires plaintiff to show
defendant's access and opportunity to copy plaintiffs work along with
evidence that the two works share "enough unique, features" to give
rise to an inference of illicit copying.147 Substantial similarity is
determined from the viewpoint of the intended audience.4 The
Seventh Circuit does not use inverse ratio rule.149
The DC Circuit alternates between the regular ordinary
observer test and the filtration/comparison test.50  It uses the
ordinary observer test when all of the elements of a work are
copyrightable, but it uses the filtration/comparison test when some of
the elements of a work are not copyrightable.151
The filtration comparison test suffers from the same faults as
the ordinary observer and extrinsic/intrinsic tests. The filtration
prong lacks a definition for "musical idea" and "musical expression,"
making filtration a rough approximation at best. The comparison
prong does not place an amount on "substantial" similarity. The
Seventh Circuit appears to have seen this dilemma in its Peters v.
West decision when it saw no need to announce which test it was
applying since "outcomes do not appear to differ."'152
142. See generally Rogers, supra note 75; Roodhuyzen, supra note 22.
143. Positive Black Talk Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 373-74 (5th Cir.
2004) rev'd on other grounds, Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010).
144. Francescatti v. Germanotta, No. 11 CV 5270, 2014 WL 2767231, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Jun.
17, 2014).
145. Rogers, supra note 75, at 923; Nicole K. Roodhuyzen, supra note 22, at 1396.
146. See generally Francescatti, 2014 WL 2767231.
147. Peters v. West, 692 F.3d 629, 633-34 (7th Cir. 2012).
148. Rogers, supra note 75, at 910.
149. Francescatti, 2014 WL 2767231, at *6.
150. Rogers, supra note 75, at 911.
151. Id.
152. Peters v. West, 692 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2012).
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IV. BLURRED LINES
The Gaye family sought to prove that Robin Thicke's "Blurred
Lines" and "Love After War" infringed Marvin Gaye's "Got to Give It
Up" and "After the Dance," respectively.153 A non-exhaustive list of
the opposition includes: Interscope Records; Pharrell Williams; Robin
Thicke; and Clifford "T.I." Harris, Jr. (collectively, the Thicke
Party).154 Because the Gaye family also alleged that Thicke and
Williams willfully infringed, the jury had to decide this issue in
addition to infringement liability. 155 At the close of trial, the jury
found Thicke and Williams liable for infringement.156  Despite
acquitting Harris and Interscope, the jury unintentionally implied
that both of those parties were also liable for infringement.157 While
the reason for this mistake is unknown, the verdict, as rendered, is of
questionable accuracy and has adversely affected the music industry
and may frustrate the goal of copyright law.
A. The Verdict's Problems and Why They Should Have Been Expected
The jury's verdict was problematic for at least two reasons.
First, the jury found that Williams and Thicke were liable for
infringement, but that neither Harris nor Interscope were. Then, on a
different part of the verdict form, the jury found that both Harris and
Interscope committed innocent infringement.1 58 Even though the jury
previously stated on the verdict form that Harris and Interscope were
not liable for infringement, its finding that they innocently infringed
implies that they also committed infringement.15 9 One might believe
that the verdict form's subsequent inquiry regarding innocent
infringement is meaningless since the jury had already stated that
Harris and Interscope did not infringe, and either a "yes" or a "no"
answer to the question of whether a party's infringement was innocent
would be ambiguous and misleading. However, the jury had the
option of leaving blank the answers that were inapplicable. In fact, it
did just that on the verdict form used to record its decision that "Love
153. See generally Reporter's Tr. of Trial Proceedings Day One-P.M. Session at 24-25,
Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-06004-JAK-AGR (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2015), ECF
No. 331 [hereinafter Day 1 Afternoon Transcript].
154. Special Verdict, supra note 8, at 1.
155. Id. at 3.
156. Id. at 1.
157. See id. at 1, 3-4.
158. Id. at 1.
159. Supra Part III ("Unintentional copying is innocent infringement and is not a defense
to an infringement claim.').
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After War" did not infringe "After the Dance.' 160 On that form, the
jury found that none of the Thicke Party infringed "After the Dance"
and declined to answer all of the remaining questions.161
Second, the jury found that Harris was not liable for
infringement even though it knew that Harris, Williams, and Thicke
all owned percentages of the musical composition of "Blurred Lines.1 62
After the trial, the Gaye family filed a Motion for Declaratory Relief in
which it asked the court to declare that Harris infringed or to render
judgment that he infringed as a matter of law.1 63 The Gaye family's
argument was that the jury found Williams and Thicke liable for
infringement because of the substantial similarity between the two
songs, so any owner of the infringing song should also be liable for
infringement.1 64 In his post-trial order altering the jury's verdict, the
judge agreed, stating, "Given the jury's conclusion that 'Blurred Lines'
was an infringing work, [Harris was] necessarily liable for
infringement as a matter of law."165
These two problems with the jury's verdict call into question
the verdict's accuracy. The first problem mentioned suggests that the
jury believed one of two things. The jury may have believed that
Thicke, Williams, and Harris all committed infringement, but liability
should be imposed only on Thicke and Williams. This is consistent
with the jury's admission that Harris infringed by finding him,
inadvertently, liable for innocent infringement. Alternatively, the jury
may have believed that Thicke, Williams, and Harris were all not
liable for infringement, but that Thicke and Williams should bear
liability anyway. Either way, it is unclear whether the jury actually
believed that "Blurred Lines" infringed "Got to Give It Up."
As long as lay juries decide infringement questions, the
accuracy of their verdicts will be in question, even without telling
special verdict forms. "Of all the arts, music is perhaps the least
tangible."1 66 Music has been described as the most abstract of all the
arts.167 Social philosopher Theodor Adorno has described it as "at once
completely enigmatic and totally evident. It cannot be solved, only its
160. Special Verdict, supra note 8, at 5-7.
161. Id.
162. Reporter's Tr. of Trial Proceedings Day 7-P.M. Session at 13, Williams v.
Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-06004-JAK-AGR (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2015), ECF No. 339
[hereinafter Day 7 Transcript].
163. JMOL Order, supra note 120, at *34-37.
164. Id. at *36.
165. Id. at *34-35.
166. Wihtol v. Wells, 231 F.2d 550, 552 (7th Cir. 1956).
167. Keyes, supra note 18, at 421.
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form can be deciphered .... ,,168 This is not a novel idea in the
copyright world; scholars have identified various reasons why
analyzing music infringement is such a difficult task. One reason is
the difference in reading and hearing music.16 9 Though two jurors
may view the same written expression, the way they hear the nuances
of that expression can vary enormously.170 This phenomenon,
resulting from individual "idiosyncrasies of the human brain and
experience" and music's neurological impact, imperils accurate
findings of infringement. 171
Another reason resides in the complexity of music itself.
172
Every piece of music contains elements of "melody, harmony, .
rhythm, . . . [tlimbre (tonal quality), tone, pitch, tempo, spatial
organization, consonance, dissonance, phrasing, accents, note choice,
combinations, interplay of instruments, . . . bass lines, and the new
technological sounds.' 173  Since the aural musical sense of most
individuals is undeveloped, only individuals with strong musical
experience can make reliable music comparisons.1 74  Even
distinguishing between lay listeners of the intended audience of the
music and lay listeners of an unintended audience can result in
inaccurate verdicts.1 75
B. Industry Problems
The possible inaccuracy of the "Blurred Lines" decision may
negatively affect the music industry. First, the case has further
obscured the concept of substantial similarity, leading to artist
uncertainty about what they own. After the trial concluded, artists
erred on the side of safety by giving writing credits out when they
otherwise would not have.1 76 This was especially true for R&B
168. Id.
169. Livingston & Urbinato, supra note 17, at 280.
170. See id.
171. Id.
172. Kim, supra note 105, at 124.
173. Id. at 124-25.
174. Michelle V. Francis, Musical Copyright Infringement: The Replacement of Arnstein
v. Porter-A More Comprehensive Use of Expert Testimony and the Implementation of an "Actual
Audience" Test, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 493, 500 (1990).
175. Paul M. Grinvalsky, Idea-Expression in Musical Analysis and the Role of the
Intended Audience in Music Copyright Infringement, 28 CAL. W. L. REV. 395, 423 (1992) ("An
unintended audience may find that the two works sound substantially alike where an intended
audience may find the two works fall short of substantial similarity.").
176. Blake Brittain, Musicians More Careful After 'Blurred Lines' Case, 90 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 2228, at 23 (Sept. 16, 2015).
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music.177 Artist Jidenna gave writing credit to Iggy Azalea believing
his hit "Classic Man" was too close to Azalea's "Fancy" to risk not
giving credit.178 Commenting on this decision, Jidenna told radio
station Hot 97, "Ever since the decision of Robin Thicke and Pharrell,
we believe that it was important to make sure that we are safe."179
Further, the trial may stifle creativity in the industry.
180
Artists have already begun to pay precautionary royalties.181 An
artist once invested his resources in the creation of a song that he
anticipated would generate profit.18 2  However, factoring this
additional expense alters the artist's economic justification for
pursuing certain songs. Thus, where anticipated precautionary
royalties drop a song below the artist's permissible profit level and the
artist decides not to create the song, the music industry loses the
creative contribution of that song and other songs that this initial song
would influence. To the extent that the trial incentivizes greater
creativity, this may also be too costly for artists to pursue. Artists
recognize that music builds upon itself and that prior art informs the




180. Jones, supra note 28, at 281 ("[Plrohibiting the liberal borrowing of ideas would
stifle the free flow of ideas necessary to facilitate true creativity."). Counsel for the Thicke party
told Rolling Stone Magazine in an interview:
"I feel like I've let songwriters around the world down by helping establish this
horrible precedent that somebody can make a claim based upon a song that sounds
the same, yet is materially different-and if they can find eight people who don't read
music, they might win," he says. When asked to explain why he feels that way, he
says, "Record labels are going to be far more reticent to put out new, good music that
is similar to the style of other music for fear that they are gonna get a claim, including
spurious claims. I mean, why wouldn't anybody bring a claim now?"
Kory Grow, 'Blurred Lines'Artists 'Sleep Well Knowing They Didn't Copy,' ROLLING STONE (Mar.
12, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/blurred-lines-artists-sleep-well knowing-they-
didnt-copy-20150312 [https://perma.ce/3LNW-ZVF9]. For another example of the music
industry's concern for stifling creativity resulting from case law, see Matthew R. Brodin,
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films: The Death of the Substantial Similarity Test in
Digital Sampling Copyright Infringement Claims-The Sixth Circuit's Flawed Attempt at a
Bright-Line Rule, 6 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 825, 826 (2005).
181. Brittain, supra note 176, at 1.
182. For a discussion on the profit incentives that copyright promotes for artists and
authors, see generally Edward C. Wilde, Replacing the Idea/Expression Metaphor with a Market-
Based Analysis in Copyright Infringement Actions, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 793, 804-05 (1995).
183. Michael Landau & Donald E. Biederman, The Case for a Specialized Copyright
Court: Eliminating the Jurisdictional Advantage, 21 HASTINGS COMm. ENT. L.J. 717, 733 (1999)
("Popular music follows well-traveled roads.").
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the artist no chance to assess its future success, possibly causing the
cost of producing the song to outweigh the benefit. 184
These music industry effects impact music copyright law in a
profound manner by distorting its incentive structure. Precautionary
royalties have now caused artists to benefit economically from their
own work and that of others. This undermines the idea that an artist
should receive the credit for his own work, which implies that only
that artist should receive such credit.18 5 If artists interpret "Blurred
Lines" as affording artists broader protection over the elements of
their works, some artists might use this windfall as a method to
increase profit margins by fixating works of questionable quality
solely to preempt works that would infringe it later.18 6 This change in
focus places less emphasis on the artists creating quality music and
more on the artist "trolling" quality music in an effort to claim sound
without developing that sound in a progressive manner.187
On the other end of the balance, the artist community may not
be able to permissibly copy a sufficient amount of material from other
artists' works in order to build upon and progress the ideas they
contain.188 This may lead artists to be more creative in attempting to
produce never-before-heard music, but it is unclear whether this
would nevertheless promote the progression of music; artists would
essentially be guessing at what unforeseen styles of music would be
good with no guarantee that any would be. With one side of the
balance engaging in monopolistic tendencies and the other side
making new ideas rather than developing old ones, there will likely be
a great deal of time and resources wasted in an inefficient manner.
Public benefit is the chief concern of copyright law,18 9 but it derives
benefit neither from artists who do not actually want to make music
nor from the inability of artists to build on the works of others.
184. 'Music is an international language that has the capacity to bring together people
from every corner of the world. It is also an economic engine, capable of yielding financial gain to
those who own and control it." Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 2005).
185. Christopher Brett Jaeger, "Does That Sound Familiar?"- Creators' Liability for
Unconscious Copyright Infringement, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1903, 1909-10 (2008) (using a labor
metaphor to show how copyright law protects artists' ownership over their own work product).
186. Counsel for the Thicke Party told Rolling Stone, "The main misconception was what
Pharrell said: 'Silk and rayon feel exactly the same but are completely different materials ....
The owner of rayon better have his eyes turned toward the owner of silk because if this decision
really stands, he's going to get sued." Grow, supra note 180.
187. See generally J.P. Mello, Technology Licensing and Patent Trolls, 12 B.U. J. SC. &
TECH. L. 388 (2006).
188. See Understahl, supra note 26, at 944.
189. Id. at 918.
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V. CHANGING THE LAW: THE MUSICAL JURY
Some authors have advanced solutions to the problems that
accompany tests for substantial similarity, but these solutions do not
adequately address the root of the problem. The best solution is to
replace the lay listener of juries with musical jurors. This will provide
a more deliberate pursuit of the goal of copyright, and its intersection
with existing solutions may provide the most benefit at the lowest
cost.
A. Other Solutions
There have been a number of solutions proposed to remedy the
difficulty of the jury's task in assessing substantial similarity.190 One
solution is a single, specialized copyright court that possesses
nationwide jurisdiction.191  Landau and Biederman proposed this
solution in response to "the lack of experience and familiarity with
copyright issues on the part of federal district court judges coupled
with the unpredictability and biases of juries, [which] leads to
frustrating and contradictory results at the district court level."192
They assert that a single court that handles copyright litigation would
be more knowledgeable of copyright law.193  This solution also
suggests that the intrinsic similarity test be applied by the court,
rather than the jury, because the jury is less knowledgeable of
copyright and because the composition of a lay jury can vary widely
depending on jurisdiction, potentially leading to adverse results across
jurisdictional boundaries.1 94  Similarly, Roodhuyzen proposes that
judges alone should decide issues of music copyright infringement
with an eye toward the incentive structure underpinning copyright
law. 195
The problem with these solutions is that judges, even if they
are more experienced with copyright law than lay jurors, are not
necessarily more experienced with music. Judges would therefore still
have difficulty defining the relevant core terms for music copyright
infringement, and verdicts of questionable accuracy would continue to
loom in the law. Second, judges are not necessarily more
190. See Austin Padgett, Note, The Rhetoric of Predictability: Reclaiming the Lay Ear in
Music Copyright Infringement Litigation, 7 PIERCE L. REV. 125, 138 (2008).
191. Landau & Biederman, supra note 183, at 719.
192. Id. at 737-38. But see Irina D. Manta, Reasonable Copyright, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1303,
1354 (2012) (explaining that judges are vulnerable to biases just as jurors are).
193. See Landau & Biederman, supra note 183, at 719.
194. Id.
195. See generally Roodhuyzen, supra note 23.
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knowledgeable than lay jurors of the proper balance of the incentive
scheme that is the backbone of copyright law. Even if judges
understand the rationale better, they will not know how "substantial"
or "insubstantial" the similarity between two songs must be in order
for other musical artists to be willing to continue creating music. If
jury verdicts vary widely by jurisdiction, the correct remedy is not
necessarily to stop the variance either. Consolidating music copyright
to one court for one judge or a few judges to decide may mean that the
verdicts are more predictable but nevertheless incorrect in the sense
that there is still no guarantee that the proper incentive balance will
be achieved.
Another solution replaces the lay listener of juries deciding
musical composition infringement with other musical composers.196
Lund proposed this after noting that the intended audience of musical
compositions is different than the intended audience of sound
recordings.197 Where the intended audience of sound recordings is
"anyone who listens to musical sound recordings," the audience for
musical compositions is "other musicians who are capable of
performing" the music.198 Because of the inability of most to read
written music and the deficiencies in music comprehension of a lay
listener, copyright infringement findings assessed by the lay listener
would be less accurate.199
One problem with Lund's solution is that audiences change.
Lund's proposal was generated, in part, from a musical composer
releasing sheet music as opposed to a sound recording on the market
for fans' enjoyment.200 Lund suggests that this indicated the intended
audience was those who could read the music. 20 1 Though this may
have been the case in that instance, a future composer may release a
simple music composition to promote musical literacy. This would
lead back to the problem of lay juries inadequately assessing
substantial similarity. Second, Lund proposes that her solution
applies only to musical composition copyright infringement cases.20 2
Because the solution does not extend to sound recording copyright
cases as well, it can only be a partial fix.
196. See generally Lund, supra note 32.
197. Id. at 63.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 63-64.
200. Id. at 61-62.
201. Id. at 63.
202. See generally id.
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B. Musical Juries
Juries should be comprised of musical artists in music
copyright infringement cases. Asking anyone other than artists to
decide what parameters best incentivize artists by giving them the
proxy tasks of defining abstract terms such as "musical idea" and
"substantial similarity" is both counterintuitive and unproductive.
These unresolvable questions are a means to an end: public benefit
through balanced incentives. Instead of being preoccupied with the
means, a musical jury would achieve the end. In contrast with Lund's
proposal, this musical jury would be the creator, as opposed to the
intended audience, and would decide music copyright infringement
cases in lieu of any audience. Additionally, this Note's solution
extends to sound recording copyright cases as well, providing a more
holistic solution to the problem.
These jurors would have at least three qualities. First, they
would be occupationally engaged in the music industry. Engagement
in the music industry encompasses professions such as singers,
songwriters, music producers and engineers, musical composers, and
others who interact with music in a similar and direct capacity.
Second, the jurors' engagements in the industry would be their
primary endeavors. This could be measured by time spent in the
music profession compared to time spent in jobs concurrently held or
possibly by income. Third, the jurors would have worked in their
professional engagements for at least a baseline number of years.
These criteria will better ensure that the jurors deciding music
copyright infringement cases are truly artists within the industry.
This solution would be congruent with the historical
development of copyright law, where the music industry shaped many
of the rights associated with the musical composition copyright and
the sound recording copyright. For example, music industry activity
spawned the development of the compulsory mechanical reproduction
right for musical composition copyrights because Congress was
concerned about music publishing companies maintaining monopolies
on musical composition copyrights.2 3  The specialization of some
artists as composers and others as performers was one reason for the
creation of the sound recording copyright.204  It was the music
industry's pressure that created the digital performance right for the
sound recording copyright.20 5 It was also the music industry that
203. Loren, supra note 25, at 680-83.
204. Lurid, supra note 32, at 67-68.
205. Loren, supra note 25, at 688.
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prompted the addition of the digital reproduction right because of
Congress's worry about royalty distributions.
206
There may be concern that the individuals of a musical jury,
with a greater stake than a lay jury in the issues it decides, would
more likely succumb to self-serving interests. To illustrate this
example, consider two artists. One artist is a deviant, tending to
create works that significantly diverge from mainstream trends.
Another artist is conservative, tending to create works that closely
track mainstream trends. One might assume that the deviant artist
would find infringement in more cases than the conservative artist in
an effort to safeguard the deviant artist's future interests in prevailing
as a plaintiff in an infringement suit. Likewise, one might assume
that the conservative artist would find no infringement in an effort to
safeguard her own interest in prevailing as the defendant in a later
copyright infringement suit.
The response to this argument is twofold. First, because
copyright law is to benefit the public, it is debatable whether artists
have a greater stake in the decision of the case than lay jurors.
Second, the artists of a musical jury deciding infringement will not
have the knowledge necessary to further their self-interests. In John
Rawls's Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, he describes the original
position and its veil of ignorance as a method by which society may
formulate the rules by which it is governed.20 7 In the original position,
the individuals deciding society's rules are unaware of their race,
wealth, religion, and any other status that may influence them to
make a decision purely because they are self-serving.208 Because of
this unawareness, Rawls described this original position as standing
behind the veil of ignorance.20 9 In practice, Rawls's formulation of the
veil and the original position was a thought experiment that would
allow individuals with self-serving interests to disregard them.
In the same way, the jurors of a musical jury will decide cases
of infringement from behind a veil of ignorance, without allowing their
personal preferences to influence their decision. The difference
between the jurors' veil of ignorance and Rawls's formulation is that
the jurors' veil is not a thought experiment; it is real, and it is
self-imposing. The most influential status of a musical juror-perhaps
the only status-that could cause that juror to decide a present case
based on self-interested motivations i  that juror's identity in a future
206. Id. at 689.
207. See generally JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE As FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 15 (Erin Kelly
ed., 2001).
208. See id. at 15.
209. Id.
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infringement suit. However, it is unlikely that a musical juror
deciding an infringement case would know whether she will sue or
will be sued for infringement after deciding this case. Incorporating
the deviant artist and the conservative artist, the deviant artist would
not find infringement simply to safeguard his interests in being the
plaintiff in a later suit; he could be the defendant. Likewise, the
conservative artist would not absolve a party of liability for
infringement to safeguard his interests in being defendant later; he
could be the plaintiff. Because the veil is self-imposed, the logistics of
actual imposition are of no concern, and the practical complications
that surely would arise from enforcement need not be addressed.
Thus, allowing the musical jury to prescribe the rules of infringement
would more efficiently pursue the goal of copyright, while avoiding the
improper influence of jurors' self-motivating desires.
VI. CONCLUSION
Music copyright law is complicated. It is essential not to lose
sight of its purpose and the method by which it achieves that purpose.
The purpose of music copyright law is to benefit the public by
progressing music. It facilitates the progression of music by carefully
balancing the interests of artists who want to benefit from the work
they produce against the interests of all other artists who want to
build upon created works. In an effort to balance these interests,
copyright law allows artists to sue for copyright infringement and
claim the benefits from their work to which they are rightfully
entitled. The circuit courts have developed various tests to enforce
copyright infringement, leading to an apparent split in the way
infringement is decided. However, a closer look reveals that each
circuit struggles with defining the same core terms that are used to
facilitate findings of infringement. The same core terms were in flux
in the "Blurred Lines" case, and the resulting jury verdict called into
question its own accuracy. The "Blurred Lines" case demonstrates the
impropriety of tasking a lay jury with the monumental task of
deciding cases of music copyright infringement. Given the complex
nature of music, lay juries should not be expected to provide accurate
verdicts in music copyright cases. Instead, juries composed of
musicians engaged in the music industry should decide issues of
infringement. These juries are best not because they have more
knowledge of music than the typical lay juror, but because they are
the best actors at deciding what incentive structure best incentivizes
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their own industry. Only with the proper incentive structure will the
public benefit from the progression of the useful art of music.
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